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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence en-
tered against the appellant in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, convicting him of 
fraudulent use of a credit card. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of the 
crime of fraudulent use of a credit card on November 30, 
1970. On January 5, 1971, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson 
committed appeliant to the Utah St.ate Prison for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent asks that the jury verdict of guilty 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of the facts given in the appellant's 
brief is essentially correct. 
State's witness Robert Rose testified that on Janu-
ary 21, 1970, the defendant entered his shop in the com-
pany of Evelyn Davis (T. 104). Mr. Rose testified that 
Evelyn Davis used the credit card in the women's de-
partment of his shop and when the defendant was asked 
if there was anything he wanted he replied that he liked 
a suit in the window (T. 108). Mr. Rose testified that 
Evelyn Davis told the defendant to try on the suit and 
that Evelyn Davis said "We will take it" (T. 109). Mr. 
Rose testified that Evelyn Davis purchased the suit with 
the credit card and upon his request she showed him ad-
ditional forms of identification (T. 111). During this 
time the defendant was standing at Evelyn Davis' side 
(T. 111). Mr. Rose testified that the value of the suit 
was $140.00 retail and between $70.00 and $75.00 at cost 
(T. 120). 
Counsel stipulated to take their exceptions to the 
jury instructions while the jury was deliberating (T. 
204) . Exception was taken to instruction 5A by the 
defendant's counsel (T. 206). 
Defendant's counsel called the court's attention w 
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it.;; proposed instruction 5A (T. 30-32). The Court re-
fused the proposed instruction (T. 31-32). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY 
USING "RETAIL VALUE" RATHER THAN 
"VALUE" IN ITS JURY INSTRUCTION 5A. 
It is the respondent's contention that "value" as used 
in Utah Code· Ann. § 76-20-8.9 (Supp. 1969) is in reality 
the retail value of the goods obtained through the fraudu-
lent use of credit and therefore, appellant was not preju-
dic-ed by the inclusion of the word "retail" in jury in-
struction 5A. 
It is generally held that "value" means market value. 
"'Value' in connection with legal problems, ordinarily 
means market value." Bagdasarian v. Gragrwn, 192 P. 
2d 935 (Cal. 1948) at 940. "When no qualification is 
expressed or implied, the term 'value' when applied t.o 
property means 'market value.' " Orford v. Topp, 346 
P. 2d 566 (Mont. 1959) at 568. "The word 'value' usually 
signifies 'market value' such terms being used inter-
changeably and both being equivalent of 'actual value' 
and 'saleable value.' " Bryant v. Stohn, 260 S. W. 2d 77 
(Tex. 1953) at 83. And finally, "The term 'value' when 
applied to property, with no qualifications expressed or 
implied means the price which the property would com-
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mand in the market." Missouri K & T Ry. v. Crews, 120 
S. W. 1110 (Tex. 1909) at 1111. 
In turn, market value has been defined as the selling 
price: 
"The expression 'market value' when used 
to determine the grade of larceny relates to buy-
ing and selling, so that the term 'value' might 
be said to be 'reasonable selling price.' " Hoff-
man v. State, 218 P. 176, 177, 24 Okl. Cr. 236 
(1923). 
"'Value' is the reasonable market value, or 
the price that a product will bring in an open 
market between a willing seller and a willing 
buyer." United States of America v. General 
Petroleum Corp. of Cal., 73 F. Supp. 225, 235 
(S. D. Cal. Cent. Div. 1946). 
In the present case there is uncontradicted evidence 
that the retail value of the suit was $140.00 (T. 120). 
[f "value" means a "reasonable selling price," Hoff man, 
supra, then it is very clear that the retail value is very 
close to the market value, if not in fact the market value, 
since it is clear that the suit could be sold for the price 
at which it was sold. The proof would be that the de-
fendant himself lxmght the suit at that price. 
Since the defendant introduced no evidence to show 
that the retail price of the suit was anything but $140.00 
and since the word "value" as used in the statute means 
retail value, the jury could not have had a reasonable 
doubt as to the value of the suit, and hence the defendant 
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was not prejudiced by the inclusion of the word "retail" 
in jury instruction 5A. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITIED NO 
NO ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
The Utah rule regarding jury instructions as to lesser 
included offenses is outlined in State v. Ferguson, 74 
Utah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929) at 56: 
"It is a well settled rule that instructions 
as to lower grades of the offense charged should 
be given when warranted by the evidence. It is 
equally well settled that in a criminal prosecu-
tion error cannot be predicated on the omission 
of the trial court to instruct as to lesser grades 
of the offense charges where there is no evidence 
to reduce the offense to a lessor grade. State v. 
Angle, et al., 61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531 (1923) ." 
(Emphasis added:) 
In ord~r for the trial court to have erred in refusing 
defendant's proposed instruction 5A, there must havei 
been substantial evidence to show that a lesser offense 
had been committed: 
". . . [I] t is well established that the court 
is not required to charge the jury on the de-
fendant's theory of the case unless it is sup-
ported by substantial evidence." State v. Mose-
ly, 75 N. M. 348, 404 P. 2d 304 (1965) at 308. 
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In the present case it is quite clear that the defen. 
dant has failed to meet this burden. No evidence what-
soever was introduced to show that the retail value of 
the suit was less than $140.00 or that a retail value of 
$140.00 was not a fair market value. 
Considering the fact that there was no evidence in-
troduced to support defendant's theory as to a lesser 
offense, the instant case fits within the Ferguson rule 
and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as t.o 
lesser included offenses constituted no error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed no error in refusing t.o 
adopt defendant's proposed instruction 5A. Therefore, 
respondent respectfully submits that this Court affirm 
the decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRE'IT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
